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SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

12 MARCH 1970

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# SURVEY

*of Communist Propaganda*

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FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

## SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

### CONTENTS

#### INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Hungarian Article Reflects Soviet Pressures on Dissidents . . . .	1
Italian CP Defends "National Roads" Thesis, Scores Stalinism . .	4
Soviet Press Polemicizes Against "Models of Socialism"	
PCI Engages in Critical Examination of Stalinism	
RINASCITA Contrasts PCI, CPSU Concepts of Party Role	
Moscow Ignores PCI Stand Against Invasion of Czechoslovakia	
Argument on Czechoslovakia Continues Between PCI and Prague	

#### THE USSR

Controversy Over Soviet Economic Reform Intensifies . . . . .	13
Liberal Economist Charged With Political Deviation	
Disenchantment With Results of Reform Increasing	
Soviet Sociological Study Shows Tatar-Russian Friction . . . . .	15

#### COMMUNIST CHINA

State Council Reemerges, Calls for Higher Cotton Yields . . . .	17
Media Advocate Improved Methods to Gain Better Crops	
PRC Media Press for Party Authority Over Mass Organizations . . .	19
More Publicity for Setting Up Low-Level Party Organs	
Topics in Brief: . . . . .	21
Grainless Pig Fodder; Steel Industry; Birth Control	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 1 -

## INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS

HUNGARIAN ARTICLE REFLECTS SOVIET PRESSURES ON DISSIDENTS

A 4 March Budapest press article entitled "In the Wake of the Moscow Conference" by Ferenc Varnai, an authoritative commentator on international communist affairs, seems designed--in Moscow's behalf--to call to account parties which boycotted or took dissident positions at the June 1969 international party conference in the Soviet capital. The article is in tune with an apparent Soviet propaganda effort to bring as many parties as possible into line prior to an expected gathering of communist leaders for the Lenin centenary in Moscow on 22 April. A series of Soviet-sponsored theoretical conferences in preparation for the centenary have been used as forums to press for a hard ideological line and to combat a rising challenge from European communist intellectuals. The latter, notably including the French CP maverick Roger Garaudy, have been using the case of Czechoslovakia in particular to raise the question of what "models" of socialism are to be created in Europe.

Soviet concern over the challenge from the dissident intellectuals has been reflected in KOMMUNIST and in a succession of Moscow press articles that take a rigid ideological line and in effect reaffirm the Brezhnev doctrine--the ex post facto rationale for the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Two lengthy articles in KOMMUNIST, signed to the press 22 January, attacked increasing "distortions" of Marxist-Leninist theory and focused on the "revisionist" views of Yugoslav theoreticians, Garaudy, Austrian CP dissident Ernst Fischer, and New Left ideologue Herbert Marcuse, all of whom were named. More recently, a Lukonin article in the 7 March PRAVDA appeared to put the participants in the April Moscow celebration on notice that approval of the intervention in Czechoslovakia would be the touchstone of "loyalty" to Moscow, terming the action of the Warsaw Five a confirmation of "loyalty to the principles of internationalism."

The 4 March Varnai article appears in NEPSZABADSAG, the organ of the Hungarian party, which had been a prime mover in preparing the 1969 Moscow conference: Budapest hosted the February-March 1968 consultative meeting which decided on the conference agenda and date and was subsequently the home base of the international preparatory commission which drafted the conference documents.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 2 -

In citing dissident parties by name Varnai's article goes beyond Soviet propaganda on the conference, which has largely been confined to generalities about the achievement of convening a gathering of 75 parties and about the concern for unity manifested by all participants, including those parties (unnamed) which refrained from fully endorsing the main document. PRAVDA on 5 March carries only a brief, general review of the NEPSZABADSAG article, including among other things the point that the conference provided a "stimulus to discussion of urgent ideological problems" of the world communist movement and strengthened the anti-imperialist struggle.

#### DISSENTING PARTICIPANTS

Following a general discussion of the conference and its ramifications the NEPSZABADSAG article mentions the four parties--those of Italy, San Marino, Reunion, and Australia--which signed only one part of the main conference document, centering its discussion on the Italian CP. "Although it disputes certain parts of the main documents," Varnai says, the Italian party has "acknowledged the comradely atmosphere" and positive results of the gathering; "moreover, although it has upheld its previous position on the Czechoslovak question and displays a certain lack of understanding toward the process of normalization there also, we are confident that the results of the Czechoslovak consolidation will win over our Italian sister party in the end." The article says nothing about the continuing polemic between leading press organs of the Czechoslovak and Italian communist parties.

The article is less conciliatory toward the British CP, which like the Norwegian party--not mentioned in the article--had deferred its decision on the main conference document pending further intraparty consultations. Evidently alluding to the reaffirmation, at a 15-18 November 1969 party congress, of the British CP's eventual acceptance of the main document with "reservations," the article portrays the party's stand as "ambiguous" and subject to change: "In the party--and this was reflected at its recent congress also--adherents of internationalism are striving more actively to change its ambiguous stand." The article ignores the fact that the British CP congress also reaffirmed the party's unambiguous condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which it also had voiced at the Moscow conference.

Varnai goes on to cite also the Dominican CP--"the only one not to sign" the main document--as torn by internal dissent on the issue:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 3 -

"According to reports," he says, "sharp polemics are transpiring within the party at the moment, because a considerable section of the party members disagrees with this attitude." The Dominican CP delegate at the Chilean Communist Party congress last December had reaffirmed his party's stand against the main document--because it was not revolutionary enough--and pleaded for the right to dissent. As quoted in the party organ EL SIGLO and by the Havana PRENSA LATINA on 7 December, the delegate said that "the differences in the formulations of ideologies and the method followed to arrive at them was the only obstacle that moved us not to sign" the main document. He added: "Let this not be a reason for slandering us or accusing us of divisionism."

The Cuban and Swedish communist parties, also nonsigners by virtue of their attendance at the conference as "observers," are cited respectively as having termed the conference "successful" and as having noted its "frank" atmosphere.

## ABSENT PARTIES

The NEPSZABADSAG article points to the communist parties of Yugoslavia (which stayed away "despite repeated invitations"), Japan, the Netherlands, China, Albania, "and a few smaller Asian countries" to show that "there still are sectarian and revisionist views harming unity," but says such "disruptive aspirations are increasingly isolated." As a consequence of this isolation, Varnai adds, "the Chinese leaders, although they have not as yet abandoned slandering the CPSU, were obliged to suspend the border provocations and sit down to negotiate with representatives of the Soviet Union."

To indicate the alleged isolation of "rightist opportunist trends emerging primarily on the pretext of the Czechoslovak events in certain parties," the article cites two divided parties which attended the conference: The French CP, it points out, "has defended the party's ideological purity in an extensive debate when it rejected Garaudy's anti-Soviet views." And "our Austrian sister party has expelled from its ranks Ernst Fischer, who acted against party unity from a revisionist platform."

Of the absentees, the article gives generally positive treatment only to the North Vietnamese party. That party, it notes, "has published the conference's documents with certain abridgement and acknowledged its efforts toward restoring unity, an anti-imperialist spirit, and solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people." The North Korean party, also absent from the conference, is not mentioned.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 4 -

ITALIAN CP DEFENDS "NATIONAL ROADS" THESIS, SCORES STALINISM

At a time when Moscow media are arguing that the thesis which allows for a large variety of "national models of socialism" smacks of "revisionism" and is contrary to Leninist teachings, Italian Communist Party (PCI) spokesmen have reaffirmed the party's allegiance to the concept of national variants, contending that it is wholly consonant with Lenin's doctrines and suggesting that those who disagree with this view are advocates of Stalinist "monolithism." Moscow has refrained from naming the targets of its polemical propaganda, which clearly include the Yugoslavs and Romanians as well as the PCI and some other Western parties. But there have been a number of indirect signs of Soviet dissatisfaction with the PCI's use of the Lenin centenary preparations to promote its "unity in diversity" line, suggesting that the Italian party is high on the list of those causing concern to Moscow.

Articles in the PCI theoretical journal RINASCITA have used the Lenin celebration as an occasion to contrast Leninism with Stalinism and even to imply that while the PCI is a party of Leninist stripe, the CPSU is still organized along Stalinist lines. Moscow has predictably ignored these heresies, condemning those who erroneously counterpose Leninism to Marxism but remaining silent on those who counterpose it to Stalinism. Beginning about a month ago, however, Prague media have taken the PCI press to task directly over its highly critical treatment of current developments in Czechoslovakia. The PCI has responded in articles in RINASCITA by editor-in-chief and Central Committee member Luca Pavolini and in the PCI newspaper L'UNITA by editor-in-chief and Politburo member Gian Carlo Pajetta.

An indication of Moscow's displeasure with the PCI's use of the Lenin anniversary to defend socialist pluralism is conveyed in a 3 March PRAVDA review of a collection of works by prominent international communists entitled "Marxism-Leninism on Proletarian Internationalism." Signed by V. Korionov, the review cites Togliatti to buttress the thesis that the Soviet model of socialism continues to have universal validity:

The world's communists emphasize . . . that the experience of the USSR and the Leninist party, like an undying beacon, has revealed the main, general law-governed patterns of socialist revolution and socialist building. Speaking in the words of P. Togliatti, the historic experience of building socialism in the Soviet Union testifies to the fact that "main principles

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 5 -

exist which make up the laws of socialism's development, and these principles are obligatory for all.

Quoting selectively from Togliatti, Korionov may have been subtly attempting here to point out to the PCI that it has strayed from Togliatti's principles. On the other side, the PCI frequently invokes Togliatti's teachings in seeking to justify a uniquely Italian road to socialism.

Sensitivity to the PCI stand on this issue seemed reflected in Soviet media's treatment of a speech delivered by PCI Politburo member Aldo Tortorella at a 24-25 February theoretical conference in Moscow on "Leninism and the World Revolutionary Process." A TASS report on 24 February, summarizing the speeches of foreign delegates, simply noted that Tortorella said the PCI rejected "any conception which considers it possible to wage a struggle for peace and socialism today without the Soviet Union or even against it." TASS ignored his defense of the need for different roads to socialism, which he linked with a condemnation of the Chinese for attempting to impose a monolithic line on all parties. According to L'UNITA's 27 February summary of the speech, Tortorella referred to the unequal development of capitalism in different countries and to "the need affirmed by Lenin to have 'Marxist programs' which refer to the concrete reality of each nation." He concluded:

That is why the PCI . . . affirms the need for roads to socialism and forms of socialist construction that are specific and are its own. It opposes the effort by the Chinese comrades to dictate to all countries the line they have considered right for themselves. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid the error of conceiving socialism as a single and equal model everywhere.

TASS, ignoring this statement, publicized the antithetical view of French CP delegate Cogniot, who stated that the recent French party congress "emphatically rejected attempts by certain pseudo-Marxists to absolutize national development and substitute the antiscientific theory on the multiplicity of the 'models of socialism' for Marxism-Leninism."

#### Soviet Press Polemicizes Against "Models of Socialism"

In January and February the Soviet press carried a number of articles arguing against the notion of "models of socialism," most authoritatively in the CPSU's KOMMUNIST signed to the press 22 January. Although the brunt of the attacks is directed against "revisionist" Yugoslav theoreticians and dissident intellectuals

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 6 -

in West European parties, as distinct from the leaderships of those parties, the assault on the notion of multiple socialist roads has applicability to the PCI.

One of the KOMMUNIST articles, by M. Iovchuk entitled "Leninism and the Present Struggle of Ideas in Philosophy," lambasts "bourgeois and revisionist interpreters" of Marx who propound "'new' so-called national models of Marxism." The author argues that "so-called 'pluralist' conceptions, according to which in our time the allegedly viable 'national models' and 'national forms' of Marxism . . . are replacing monolithic Leninism, are erroneous." In the other KOMMUNIST article, entitled "Concerning the Revisionist Concept of 'Models of Socialism'" and concerned in part with rebutting the views of the French CP dissident Roger Garaudy, Kh. Modzhyan observes that "the fallacious concept of 'models of socialism'" was sharply criticized at the June international communist conference and charges that proponents of this view "try all ways of denigrating the socialism that actually exists, of reducing it to some distortions or other, and of presenting it as bureaucratic, undemocratic, and so forth." Modzhyan contends that those who hew to the "models of socialism" thesis are embracing a doctrine "directed against international unity of all detachments of the world communist movement" and one that is "incompatible with proletarian internationalism."

An effort to tar the pluralist notions of such parties as the PCI with the brush of anticommunism is evident in an 8 February SOVIET RUSSIA article by Candidate of Economic Sciences G. Khromushin, in the course of a discussion of the tactics employed by contemporary anticommunists. Citing the work of U.S. scholar Theodore Draper as illustrative of those who postulate the existence of "two communisms"--a "Western" variant which is less dangerous than the "Eastern" type--he quotes Draper as stating that if the French and Italian parties fall under the influence of "the new Western communism . . . , the consequences may be immeasurable." Khromushin concludes:

The concept of 'new Western communism' clearly reflects the characteristic feature of modern anticommunism--the desire to represent Soviet experience as a nationally limited phenomenon . . . of a semi-Asian type, and completely unsuitable for the Western and Eastern European countries. The anti-Soviet essence of modern anticommunism appears most clearly in the presentation of the 'Soviet model' as supposedly 'bureaucratic,' bound by dogma, and not fit to be the pioneer of progressive development in the modern world.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 7 -

PCI Engages in Critical Examination of Stalinism

In keeping with party leader Luigi Longo's call to the PCI last October to launch an inquiry into conditions in socialist countries, and in line with suggestions in the party press that a long-deferred examination of Stalinism be initiated,\* a number of articles discussing aspects of Stalinism have appeared in RINASCITA during the last several months.

One such article--by Valentino Gerratana in the 31 October issue--in effect equated opposition to varying "national models" of socialism with a "Stalinist" distortion of Leninism. Marxism, "up to and including Lenin," the author argued, viewed socialism as a "system of transition" in the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a communist society. Gerratana declared that Stalin threw this "classic" socialist concept "overboard," replacing it with another theoretical scheme which later proved "inconsistent with reality." Discarding the idea of socialism as a transitional phase, he continued, Stalin replaced it with "a notion of the 'socialist society' as a new economic-social formation, homogeneous in its structures and superstructures"; Stalin used this concept to justify "the practice of monolithism and of the state-guide as essential factors in internationalism," while by contrast the "Leninist" idea of a "transitional" system directly supports the idea of national roads and models:

In this theoretical scheme . . . the function of the "national ways" is easily understood. If socialism is a system of transition through a whole period of world's history, it is irrational to hypothesize a single model of socialist society. Each country can build socialism only on the basis of its own history . . . .

Gerratana concluded that only by conceiving of socialism as "a system of transition" can the "centrifugal forces" that have increasingly appeared in the socialist countries be understood and confronted.

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\* For background on the speech in which Longo called for such a study and on a RINASCITA article urging an examination of Stalinism, see the 18 December 1969 FBIS SURVEY, pages 20-21.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 8 -

The Gerratana article touched off a polemic in the pages of RINASCITA, with pro-Soviet PCI member Ambrogio Donini writing a "Rebuttal to the Theses of 'Theoretical Stalinism'" which appeared in the 26 December issue. Donini charged Gerratana with "denying the existence of a socialist society in the Soviet Union" by alleging that Stalin had confused "nationalization with socialization." The view that Stalin had discarded the idea of socialism as a transitional system and replaced it with another theoretical model, he contended, "has no basis in theory, in politics, or above all in history." On 2 January 1970 RINASCITA published a counter-rebuttal by PCI Central Committee member and editor-in-chief of the PCI bimonthly CRITICA MARXISTA Emilio Sereni. Quoting at length from Gerratana's article, including his statement linking the idea of socialism as a transitional phase with "national roads," Sereni praised him for raising a problem of "considerable historiographic and theoretical importance" and scored Donini for refusing to recognize that such a problem exists. He went on to spell out the issues:

Has there been or has there not been a change . . . in the very notion itself of socialism, with a shift of emphasis from a conception of socialism as a system of transition to communism toward [a conception of] a relatively autonomous socioeconomic formation? Is it true or not that this shift in emphasis corresponded to a change in theoretical and practical positions in response to such problems as those of national paths and socialist democracy?

Admonishing Donini to "look around," Sereni cited the expansion of "centrifugal phenomena" as evidenced by Sino-Soviet conflict and referred to diverse Yugoslav, Cuban, Chinese, and other socialist models to buttress his case.

#### RINASCITA Contrasts PCI, CPSU Concepts of Party Role

RINASCITA on 26 December carried an article by Francesco Malfatti entitled "The Leadership Function of the Party" which pictured a sharp dichotomy between the PCI's conception of the role and function of the party and that of the CPSU. To the Soviets, Malfatti observed, "the party as the center of everything becomes identified with all of society and does not recognize any independent power center except as a transmission belt." The PCI, on the other hand, repudiates "the ideological state" and conceives of "a party which is neither the center of everything nor an absolute entity which identifies with all of society, but which seeks and develops a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 9 -

dialectical relationship with other independent centers of democratic and socialist power . . . ."

Malfatti emphasized that this difference cannot be ascribed to "national particularities," since the PCI's scheme is based on "the universality of Leninism" and because "there is only one way of conceiving the leadership function of the party." He implied that the Soviet view of the party is based on Stalinism, and he described the CPSU as "intransigent" about its concept of the party's leadership function. This, Malfatti said, produces a "theoretical and political knot, of a universal nature, which must be untied." Alluding to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, he observed that it was not so much a consequence of a clash about "national roads" but rather over "socialist democracy," adding his belief that there could be no socialist democracy "without democracy within the party and without a leadership function of the party understood in Lenin's terms."

Malfatti concluded that while "existing diversities" between socialist parties and states are generally recognized, what is not recognized is the fact that "monolithism" cannot be viewed as "a particularity of any of the existing socialist nations." In effect, he argued that the Italian "road to socialism" as it applies to the leadership function of the party is not simply a national variant, but the only conception of the party's role consonant with Leninism. Returning to the question of "diversities," he concluded that "it is one thing to confront them with the doctrine and practice of Leninism, and another to confront them with the 'doctrine' and practice of Stalinism."

The PCI's continuing concern about Stalinism was emphasized in a

10 January L'UNITA article by Giuseppe Boffa, the paper's leading commentator on international communist affairs. Objecting to the fact that the period of Stalin's rule has never been fully examined in the USSR and remarking that there has been a "strong attenuation" of criticisms of Stalin since "the Prague spring," Boffa declared that for the PCI "the problem of Stalinism cannot be closed," because it is through an examination of this phenomenon that the party "has developed the conviction that progress must be made along new roads."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 10 -

Moscow Ignores PCI Stand Against Invasion of Czechoslovakia

In a 10 December PRAVDA editorial article Moscow welcomed the PCI's ouster of anti-Soviet leftist dissidents associated with the publication IL MANIFESTO, and a 3 February PRAVDA report again lauded the purge of these "opportunists" who were guilty of "a fair amount of anti-Sovietism." But Soviet media have never fully acknowledged the PCI's continuing dissent over the Czechoslovak issue and have generally implied that the IL MANIFESTO group was alone in its anti-Soviet leanings. A 13 February PRAVDA article by Korionov, discussing the PCI's celebration of the Lenin centenary, does note that there are still "within the party . . . elements which would like to push it on an erroneous course and . . . into anti-Soviet positions," but Korionov makes no reference to the party's continuing criticism of the August 1968 invasion and the ensuing events.

By contrast, a 4 March article in the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG, dealing with the current positions of parties which had been dissenters at the Moscow international communist conference last June, observes that the PCI upholds "its previous position on the Czechoslovak question and displays a certain lack of understanding of the process of normalization there also." It goes on to wishfully express confidence that "the results of the Czechoslovak consolidation will eventually win over our Italian sister party."\*

Argument on Czechoslovakia Continues Between PCI and Prague

The PCI press and the Czechoslovak party press are in the midst of an increasingly abrasive polemic primarily over RINASCITA's disparaging treatment of recent developments in Prague.\*\* Czechoslovak ire was initially aroused by a 23 February RINASCITA article in which Franco Bertone criticized statements made by Czechoslovak First Secretary Husak in a RUDE PRAVO interview. Bertone took Husak to task for showing "determination to smash to dust the political

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\* A fuller discussion of the Hungarian comment appears on page 1 of today's SURVEY.

\*\* The polemic is reminiscent of a verbal skirmish that developed between the Czechoslovaks and the British CP last September. For a discussion see the FBIS TRENDS of 31 December 1969, pages 24-25, and the FBIS SURVEY of 4 December 1969, pages 18-20.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 11 -

platform of the 'new direction'" and for denying "any need for economic reform" while recommending a reversion to "the strict economic centralization that was already on its way out when Novotny was in power."

RUDE PRAVO replied to Bertone on 3 February, deploring his "lack of understanding of the basic sense of Husak's words" and concluding with an offer to explain Czechoslovak party policy to the PCI "if interest is shown."

Three days later RINASCITA's chief editor Pavolini came to Bertone's defense, observing that "a profound crisis situation" in Czechoslovakia "does not in any way seem headed for a solution" and reasserting the PCI's view that the August 1968 invasion not only has not solved any of the problems the "new course" was designed to cope with, but makes it impossible to solve them. He remarked caustically that RINASCITA "fully implements" the Prague paper's recommendation that every party expound the positions of other parties by publishing their official documents and articles. And he said RINASCITA would be very interested in knowing "the present terms of the internal debate in Czechoslovakia . . . and what the comrades who were replaced had to say."

L'UNITA became involved in the polemic on 17 February when it published a favorable review by Boffa of a book by the Czechoslovak expatriate A.J. Liehm, in which Boffa lauded the preface written by Jean Paul Sartre. RUDE PRAVO responded on the 25th with an article accusing Boffa of trying to justify Sartre's "anti-Sovietism" and of echoing the views of the purged IL MANIFESTO dissidents. On the same day the Czechoslovak CP weekly TVORBA carried an article by its chief editor Jiri Hajek criticizing RINASCITA for casting the new Czechoslovak leadership "in the role of the guilty party, responsible for the state of affairs of which this same leadership has been fighting for a way out for our country since April of last year." Charging that Pavolini and Bertone air views similar to those expressed by "Italian noncommunist newspapermen" and warning them not to explain "our differences" on the basis of "so-called outside pressure," Hajek reminded them that the PCI had always considered "anti-Sovietism to be identical with anticommunism" and had reaffirmed this during the IL MANIFESTO affair.

In the most recent round in the polemic, L'UNITA responded to both RUDE PRAVO and TVORBA in a 5 March article by chief editor Pajetta, who saw as key factors underlying Prague's pursuit of the polemic

the intention of wanting to determine--or of demanding outright from us--a stand, some kind of a healing medium

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 12 -

by which to close the chapter of the differences concerning the past and thus turn over the page relative to the problems of the Czechoslovak events and crises. A principle is almost enunciated according to which our inquiry and our conclusions . . . should be conducted and formulated solely by taking up the judgments and analyses provided from time to time by the leading organs of the Czechoslovak party.

Remarking that the PCI is reproached by Prague for having "placed excessive trust in Dubcek, Smrkovsky, and Cernik" and is now being asked to accept as valid the criticisms directed against those leaders as well as all the other "normalization" measures, all "in the name of the current official policy compared with what was yesterday's official policy," he reminded the Czechoslovaks of the emphasis at the PCI's 12th congress on the party's "full autonomy of judgment" in evaluating the policies and actions of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Pajetta completed his rejoinder by defending Boffa's evaluation of Sartre against RUDE PRAVO's criticism.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 13 -

## THE USSR

CONTROVERSY OVER SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM INTENSIFIES

The longstanding dispute over reforms in the command economy appears to be intensifying as a result of the slowdown in Soviet economic growth and the general deficiencies disclosed at the December CPSU plenum. Conservative spokesmen, apparently emboldened by the existence of widespread disenchantment over the results of the reforms instituted in 1965, are now attacking liberal critics of the command economy by name and in particularly abusive terms. In the past, attacks of this kind were leveled mainly at Czech and Yugoslav economic reformers rather than at their Soviet counterparts. The latter, while clearly on the defensive, continue to appeal for more active implementation and extension of the 1965 reforms in economic management.

Liberal Economist Charged With Political Deviation

A 5 March article in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY by the economists M. Kovaleva and K. Korytov marks a major escalation of the dispute over the economic reforms. The authors of the article clearly display their conservative bias in a scathing review of a book by the liberal economist Boris Rakitskiy which was published in 1968 under the title "Forms of Economic Leadership of Enterprises." The review is particularly noteworthy for its abusive tone, comparable to the invective common in the Stalin era but rarely in evidence in recent times.

Declaring at the outset that Rakitskiy's book is motivated by a desire to revise "the fundamental principles" of Soviet economic policy, the authors of the review present a lengthy bill of particulars. These include the charges that Rakitskiy disparages the Soviet system of centralized planning by treating it as "inherent only in a backward and 'unbalanced' economy," and that he seeks to replace the planning system with a market economy. Toward this end, they charge, Rakitskiy proposes that enterprises be granted greater autonomy in the form of "free choice of partners" and "fixing prices by contract." The introduction of these reforms would, in Rakitskiy's view, enable enterprises to cope more effectively with the problems of plant specialization and technological change.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 14 -

Rakitskiy's critics repudiate his "erroneous views and recommendations" largely on political grounds. They point out that the December plenum reaffirmed the decisive prerogatives of ministries in the sphere of plant specialization and technological innovation, and they reject Rakitskiy's view that such functions could be managed more effectively at the enterprise level. And they charge that the effect of his recommendations would be "to exclude the central agencies from the system of managing production and to lessen the role of the party in the leadership of economic construction."

But the most serious indictment of Rakitskiy--reminiscent of the polemics of the Stalin era--is that his mistakes derive from a "disregard of a class approach" to economics. In other words, Rakitskiy gave precedence to "technical" and "organizational" considerations over ideological considerations in his analysis of the Soviet economy.

This accusation of political deviation goes beyond any previous criticism of Rakitskiy and his reformist colleagues. For example, although Rakitskiy was criticized in 1966 for some of the very same mistakes cited in the current attack, the criticism was not abusive in character and did not refer to him by name (A. Bachurin in ECONOMIC GAZETTE No. 45, 1966).<sup>\*</sup> The broad implications of the current accusations may also be gauged by the fact that Rakitskiy's book received highly favorable reviews in 1969 in NOVY MIR No. 7 and PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS No. 10. Against this background, the accusation of political deviation and the criticism of Rakitskiy's publisher, the "Science" Publishing House, seems clearly aimed at suppressing reformist criticism of the command economy.

#### Disenchantment With Results of Reform Increasing

The effort to silence critics of the command economy coincides with plain indications of growing disenchantment over the results of the 1965 reforms. A 9 January SOCIALIST INDUSTRY article by a prominent Leningrad industrial executive, G.I. Kulagin, disclosed that a majority of economic managers--"both 'above' and 'below'"--were distressed over the disappointing results of the economic

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<sup>\*</sup> For background, see FBIS SURVEY for 23 November 1966, pages 41-44.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 15 -

reform. An even more alarmist view was expressed by one of the reform's leading public spokesmen, the economist A. Birman, in the December issue of NOVY MIR. Birman reported that opposition to the reform was "fairly broad and extensive" and was rooted essentially in concern over any weakening of state control over the economy.

Birman also alluded to the fears aroused by the abortive Czech reforms and the exploitation of these fears by opponents of the Soviet reform. Without mentioning Czechoslovakia, he asserted, "We must take these facts into consideration since they really occurred. However, we must not reject economic methods because they were incorrectly applied in some places: we do not abolish money because counterfeiters may exist."

Birman's concern over opposition to the reform was a central feature of his 11 February LITERARY GAZETTE article. Arguing against any reversion to the methods of the past and urging more active implementation of the reforms initiated in 1965, Birman reflected on the importance of time--"even a long time"--as an antidote to the ills of the economy. However, the possibility that time may be running out on the reform and its benefactors would seem to be strengthened by the virulence of the attack on Rakitskiy and by the rising chorus of agitation for tighter labor discipline, stricter economy, and increased party control--measures that directly conflict with the purposes of the reform.

#### SOVIET SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY SHOWS TATAR-RUSSIAN FRICTION

According to an official study, Tatar intelligentsia tend to show more anti-Russian bias than Tatar manual laborers, and contact between Tatar and Russian intelligentsia worsens rather than improves mutual understanding. Researchers found that anti-Russian bias among the Tatar intelligentsia, instead of being merely a survival of the past, is generated by competition for jobs and social status and thus is impervious to the traditional methods of combating nationalism--propaganda and education, teaching of the Russian language, and increased intercultural contacts.

The study by the sociological research sector of the Academy of Sciences' Ethnography Institute was described by Yuriy Arutyunyan, chief of this sector, in the December 1969 issue of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY. Researchers interviewed 2,500 Russians and Tatars in rural areas of the Tatar ASSR to determine attitudes in regard to mixed marriage and employment under bosses of another nationality.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 16 -

Predictably, the study found negative attitudes among only a small number, mostly elderly, and cited this finding as proof of the success and correctness of Soviet nationalities policy.

The study also turned up some apparently unexpected results, however. Arutyunyan devotes much attention to the fact that the more educated Tatars, those engaged in nonmanual labor, are more biased against Russians than manual laborers and that traditional methods of breaking down these attitudes--integration, study of the Russian language, propaganda and education--not only fail as far as the intelligentsia are concerned, but are often counterproductive. As the author puts it, "the effect of knowing the Russian language and contact with all-union culture seems to disappear among the intelligentsia," and positive "internationalist" attitudes among the intelligentsia "are not stronger than among other strata of the population, but rather even the opposite."

More detailed study of the jobs and social status of the intelligentsia led the researchers to conclude that there are different bases for bias among the intelligentsia than among the poorly educated and tradition-oriented. Among the intelligentsia, anti-Russian bias appears to be based on competition for jobs, social status, and opportunities for advancement, and is aggravated rather than reduced by working with Russians. This latter point is proved by data showing a much higher rate of anti-Russian feeling among Tatar intelligentsia living in villages with mixed Russian-Tatar population than in all-Tatar villages. The opposite was true for Tatar manual laborers: working and living with Russians sharply reduced their bias.

While he demonstrates the ineffectiveness of orthodox measures of combating nationalism among the intelligentsia, the author proposes little in the way of a cure. He suggests tentatively an intensification of "internationalist" influence on Tatar children in hopes of reducing subsequent tendencies to bias when competition for jobs takes over.

The significance of the tensions discovered is perhaps heightened by the fact that the declared goal of the study was not just to investigate Tatar attitudes but to examine the more general phenomenon of ethnic relations in varying social strata and situations. The Tatar republic was selected for the pilot study because it "to a significant degree reflects the social structure and social processes characteristic for Soviet society as a whole."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 17 -

## COMMUNIST CHINA

STATE COUNCIL REEMERGES, CALLS FOR HIGHER COTTON YIELDS

Continuing normalization of the PRC's administrative structure was indicated on 6 March when NCNA reported that the State Council had recently held a national conference on cotton production. There is no indication that a plenary meeting of the Council itself was convened; the last reported plenary session, in March 1966, dealt with spring agricultural planning. The Council had not publicly been cited as performing a function since March 1966 except in conjunction with other bodies. Even in this latest instance, the party's supremacy over the state organ was made clear via the notation that "responsible comrades of the party Central Committee" had received the delegates to the conference, listened to reports, and delivered "important speeches."

The message apparently conveyed to the delegates is consistent with the general propaganda line on grain production as the primary factor; but the mere fact that the conference did concentrate on cotton does seem to step up the priority for this crop. Delegates were told that cotton areas are to increase yields while aiming for self-sufficiency in grain, with the immediate aim of at least achieving the goals for both cotton and grain set by the 12-year agricultural plan of 1956. Statistics released by NCNA indicate that increased cotton output will not be derived from planting cotton on land which can be used for grain: Cotton yields have risen 12.2 percent compared with the last precultural revolution crop in 1965, while the average per-mou yield has grown at the slightly higher rate of 12.5 percent--indicating that the stress on grain production over the past few years has resulted in slightly less acreage for cotton.

While Shanghai and Chekiang are the only first-level administrative units said to have exceeded the goal set by the national agricultural program of 100 catties of ginned cotton per mou, figures given for many model areas invited to the conference far exceeded this figure, even in areas with poor growing conditions. One brigade in Anhwei is said to have increased its average per-mou yield from 45 to 154 catties per mou in "less than a year." A Kiangsu brigade that has achieved an average per-mou yield of 163 catties for cotton and 1,450 for grain (which has a 12-year-program quota of 800 catties) was advanced as "an example of high yields in the south."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 18 -

Although the achievements set forth as examples by the report on the conference seem to smack of leap-forward goals impossible of rapid achievement, there is no indication that localities are being asked to rush into such programs. While Mao's thought is cited as the source of the great advances made by the exemplary areas, the conference did not advocate general solutions to problems but instead "demanded" that revolutionary committees disseminate the experiences achieved by the model areas "in a way suited to the various localities."

#### Media Advocate Improved Methods to Gain Better Crops

A general propaganda campaign in behalf of redoubled efforts during the spring planting season has been highlighted by a 7 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and articles published in RED FLAG No. 3, released 28 February. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the first one it has published on its own on a domestic issue since last November, consisted mostly of traditional platitudes. Unlike the spring planting editorial last March, it provided no new insights into agricultural policy.

A RED FLAG report detailing the experience of a model brigade in Anhwei, and broadcast by the Hofei radio on 9 March, was quite specific in outlining measures to be adopted in order to raise yields. The picture that emerges from the report is not one of a sudden flowering of played-out fields fertilized by Mao's thought, but that of an arduous, well-planned effort by a competent brigade leader to reclaim alkaline land. The brigade is said to have received over one million catties of relief grain from 1950 to 1964 as well as over 100,000 yuan in state aid; now its grain and cotton crops exceed the goals set by the national program for development of agriculture, and it sells its excess to the state.

The first measure adopted by a new leader transferred to the brigade in late 1964 was in the area of ideological rectification; he sought to overcome the notion that the brigade must turn to commerce or the people drift away to the cities. Then a soil survey was taken to determine how much of the alkaline land could be improved and to identify the areas for improvement. The alkaline soil was removed, good soil from a canal was brought in, irrigation was improved--all without state aid, the article makes clear--and over the years production was gradually raised through continuous hard labor. Not only was the soil changed but eight swamps were filled in and an equal number of machine-pumped wells

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 19 -

were dug to ease drought problems. Other measures adopted include establishing a full-time team to stock up on fertilizer, one-third more multiple cropping, and diversified planting to suit specific conditions.

The Anhwei brigade is not being presented as a typical example (the article notes that for a brigade to achieve so much so quickly "is something rarely seen north of the Huai River") but as a model for other brigades, especially the poor ones. Problems that the brigade encountered are glossed over, although the article indicates that during the first year of the new leadership in 1965 production fell off from the previous year, described as the "peak year prior to the cultural revolution." The report does not state how much of the land has actually been reclaimed, although all of it was said to have been "worked over." If all or most is now being planted and is included in the per-mou statistics, large numbers of outsiders must have joined the brigade; its original population was only 700 people, an insufficient number to intensively farm the stated 1,700 mou while performing the indicated improvements.

#### PRC MEDIA PRESS FOR PARTY AUTHORITY OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

While progress has recently been noted in rebuilding basic-level party branches, Peking and Shanghai media are complaining that the new party organs have run into difficulty in asserting their authority over "the mass organizations." Some of the criticism against those who seek to place mass organizations above the party is doubtless aimed at local revolutionary committees reluctant to surrender their prerogatives. Although the supremacy of reconstructed party units over revolutionary committees has been clearly stated, the issue apparently remains subject to misunderstandings.

On 9 March an NCNA report on activities at the Peking woolen textile mill argued forcefully for supremacy of the party organization over the revolutionary committee and mass organizations. The report stated that the party committee in the mill had leadership authority over the revolutionary committee there as well as over lower-level party branches, worker representatives, and Communist Youth League and militia organizations. Decisions on important questions are made by the party committee, with the revolutionary committee then executing the decision "under the leadership of the party committee." The revolutionary committee must then report to the party committee "on how the decisions are being carried through."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 20 -

NCNA also explained how hierarchical party authority operates in the mill. Differences of opinion between the party committee and "some of the party branches" are resolved by consulting each party member concerned prior to a party meeting; then decisions are reached through discussion, after which the committee secretaries and deputy secretaries decide how to implement the decision. The report claimed that this method had instructed party members at all levels in the mill in the concept of democratic centralism.

Shanghai has also reflected concern in regard to the leadership role of the party over mass organizations. On 22 February Shanghai radio condemned the idea that party units and organs of state power are on equal footing as "a counterrevolutionary aim" to "oppose the leadership of the party." The broadcast called for more party members to be placed "in the leading positions in the state power structure" so that state power is "under the absolute leadership of the party." On 26 February Shanghai restated the thesis that "the party is the core of leadership of the masses of people" and that "the masses must firmly establish the concept of the party's leadership and consciously accept this leadership." The broadcast claimed that many mass organizations played their revolutionary role well during the cultural revolution only because "they were led by the party." Without the leadership of the party, Shanghai declared, the mass organizations "will inevitably run counter to the main orientation of the revolution" and go astray. On 5 March Shanghai chided those "self-styled representatives of the interests of the masses" who "have placed the mass organizations above the party organization." The broadcast observed that, while close ties with the masses should be established, it is "wrong for some comrades to hold the view that 'we must do everything the way the masses want.'"

#### More Publicity for Setting Up Low-Level Party Organs

Another province has reported establishment of a party committee at the county level. On 28 February Lanchow radio reported on a party committee for Chinan county in Kansu. Only Hunan and Heilungkiang had previously reported county party committees, while Kwangtung has reported a city committee.

The Kansu report stressed that the Chinan party committee had worked jointly with the county revolutionary committee there on various agricultural problems in Chinan. In contrast, a 27 February Changsha radio report on the party committee of Taoyuan county, one of seven county-level committees announced in Hunan last December, did not mention the county revolutionary committee, even though the report was lengthy and detailed.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 21 -

During the past two weeks, the provincial radios of Fukien, Kirin, Kwangsi, and Shantung have referred to newly established party branches in their areas. These are the first monitored reports of new party organs for each of these areas. Shansi, Sinkiang, Tibet, and Yunnan are now the only first-level administrative units which, judging by monitored local broadcasts, have reported no new local party organs. (No reports have been monitored from Kweichow, Szechwan, Hopeh, and Tientsin as well, but their local radios are broadcasting no local news at all.)

## TOPICS IN BRIEF

## GRAINLESS PIG FODDER

During Peking's year-long campaign to popularize pig-breeding there have been numerous references to new fermented pig fodders. Recent releases, including an NCNA report on 26 February, assert that the latest measures on increasing the numbers of pigs (important as a source of fertilizer) take account of the need to conserve grain. NCNA praises a Shenyang PLA company for developing a feed which "does away with using grain in pig fodder," contains a dozen nutrients, and has some bacteria-killing effect. The article indicates that "great importance" was attached to the experiment by the Shenyang Military Region; it was "popularized in 98 percent of the unit's subordinate organs in less than a month." The PLA company has already saved 20 tons of grain through using the new fodder, and the Shenyang units are now "passing on the advanced experience to the local peasants." Another NCNA report on 8 March noted a similar experiment in Kiangsi, which would allow more "pig breeding and provide more fertilizer." While the PLA experiment relied on the stalks and husks of domesticated plants, the Kiangsi fodder is said to use the leaves or roots of six wild plants.

## STEEL INDUSTRY

Several recent items indicate that China's steel industry, overbuilt during the leap-forward period, is now working at full capacity. Foochow radio on 18 February reported that the Sanming plant had brought into production a furnace not utilized for eight years and that a steel-rolling mill unused for five years had been repaired and pressed into service. On 6 March NCNA reported that a county in Hopeh had reopened seven small iron mines which "supported production by big iron and steel plants." Extension of the small iron and steel industries now being set up in some iron-mining areas was also publicized by Nanchang on 20 February.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
12 MARCH 1970

- 22 -

BIRTH CONTROL

A 28 February Foochow broadcast explained that a major benefit of birth control is the freeing of "additional labor force for production." In a certain brigade, the radio noted, many women were formerly unable to do productive labor because they had too many children. But over the past few years the brigade's birth rate has been "sharply" reduced, freeing labor and improving health conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL